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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
The cultural sector has become the object of new attention in the public economics literature.1 It is widely 
recognised as essential for the human capital formation of a country and makes a positive contribution to 
economic growth both by playing an important role in social inclusion and integration policies, in the 
light of increasing immigration phenomena, and by generating positive externalities for a number of 
economic activities like tourism (Toswe, 2010). In Italy two main actors, central government and 
municipalities, cover about 90% of total public spending for culture (Bodo, 2006; Bodo and Bodo, 2007). 
As shown in Figure 1, in the years 2005 and 2006 municipalities and central government spent, 
respectively, about 3.2%-3.3% and 0.34%-0.29% of their own balance sheets on cultural expenditure 
(Berna Berionni, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.  Share of cultural public spending (percentage on their own total balance):  
      Years 2005 and 2006 
 
 
 
The central government of Italy traditionally plays a major role in the cultural sphere, in that, 
under the existing legislation, it supervises/protects the nation’s artistic heritage. Nevertheless, as far as 
the overall expenditure for culture is concerned, in recent years the municipal governments have 
strengthened their position, not only in traditional areas such as the management of civic libraries, 
museums and theatres, but also through the organisation of cultural events in the field of the performing 
arts (both heritage and contemporary), which are becoming increasingly important for households’ 
preferences (Figure 2). Therefore, understanding the driving forces of local cultural public spending is 
also important for its consequences on residents’ life.  
 
                                                
1 See, amongst others, Peacock 1969 and 2004; Santagata, 2006; Schuster, 2006; Throsby, 2001; Toswe, 2003 and 2010; 
Blaug, 2003, Netzer 1978, 2003 and 2006; Frey 2000 and 2003; Frey and Meier 2006; O’Hagan 2003; Seaman 2003; Baumol 
2003 and 2006. 
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Figure 2. Percentage variation of cultural consumption and hobbies by type of entertainment 
(1999-2007) 
 
Source: ISTAT – Survey on Housholds - Multiscopo  
 
Here, we concentrate on the determinants of the per-capita cultural current expenditures of all 
8,100 Italian municipalities. We take advantage of a rich and detailed dataset composed by the balance 
sheets of all the Italian municipalities, as provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs,2 which has 
been merged with the demographic and economic data provided by the municipalities themselves as well 
as by the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT). The universe of Italian municipalities is, per se, 
remarkably heterogeneous, being composed of units of different population size, located in different 
geographical areas, and with quite different historical and cultural traditions. Moreover, given the 
complexity of the function played by these local institutions and in the absence of usual market signals, 
municipal spending for culture cannot be properly explained only by the traditional determinants of 
public spending – for instance as a budget allocation among the different (cultural) goods and services 
supplied by the municipalities, given population and local income. Indeed, the production of cultural 
outputs rarely conforms to a production line type technology, where a set of clearly identifiable inputs is 
used to produce a standard type of output. Rather, cultural spending is broadly tailor-made to the specific 
needs of individual recipients. Therefore the production process is much less clearly defined and there is 
also the potential for considerable heterogeneity in what outputs are produced and how this is done. 
Contributions to the cultural production process are often made by multiple agents or organizations; a 
“cultural package” might be delivered over multiple time periods and in different settings; and the 
                                                
2 In the balance sheet the total expenditures are broken down into twelve different functional areas, e.g., general 
administration, justice, local police, public education, cultural services, sport and leisure, tourism, roads and transport, 
environment, social services, economic development, productive services.  
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responsibility for delivery might vary from place to place and over time. We shall try to explain the 
heterogeneity of the local expenditures for culture as a function of observable characteristics, while 
recognizing that unobservable heterogeneity might also play a role and must somehow be recovered.  
Among observable characteristics, when considering local cultural spending two basic elements 
must be considered: information about different cultural outputs (see section 2 below) and environmental 
constraints faced in the local decision (including, amongst others, local public choices made as the result 
of bargaining inside the council, and the composition of the population with respect to gender and 
citizenship. Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2009) investigated the relationship between Italian municipalities’ 
spending on culture and the political/partisan features of local governments, focusing on 106 Italian 
municipalities (i.e., those which are also provincial administrative capitals) and found that some political 
variables significantly affect local cultural expenditure. Here, the analysis of cultural spending across the 
universe of 8,100 Italian municipalities does not allow us to single out a basic political feature of the local 
governments, namely whether they are left- or right-wing oriented.3 Nevertheless, the data from the 
Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs contain detailed information on the composition of each local council 
as for the age, gender and education of both the mayor, the councilors and other elected representatives. 
This kind of information is important in order to explain heterogeneity, since very similar municipalities 
make quite different cultural choices with remarkable different consequences (as we will see below). As 
for the composition of the population, at least three elements could be important for the final outcome of 
per capita cultural expenditures: they are the gender, age and citizenship of the inhabitants. The 
demographic structure of the population might well be relevant for the peculiar type of public 
expenditures considered. For different reasons, it might be that, for instance, the higher/lower the 
percentage of women/men in a given area, the higher/lower the cultural expenditures; or the 
older/younger the population the higher/lower the cultural expenditures. The distinction of the population 
by nationality is another potentially significant issue. It is usually argued that immigrants tend to free-ride 
on natives for publicly supplied goods and services, thus increasing their cost for the entire community 
(Borjas, 1995). In the case of cultural spending, however, the opposite thesis might also be true: 
difficulties related to integration and cultural differences might lead the immigrants not to consider the 
public supply of cultural services, relying instead on their own private networks for their (national, 
religious or ethnic) provision of cultural goods, whatever this might mean. In this study, we will be able 
to evaluate the impact of immigration on cultural expenditure, although only on a shorter sample period: 
by considering the share of immigrants in each single municipality (relevant details are available from 
                                                
3 The reason for this is that most municipalities – especially the smallest ones, which are, however, more than the 70% of the 
total – are run by so called “civic coalitions” of undistinguishable/unidentifiable political “colour”. 
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2002 onwards), we can test whether immigrants actually increase the per capita cultural supply for the 
local community (i.e., the higher the number of immigrants, the higher the expenditure). If immigrants 
play no role in cultural spending, or if immigrants rely on their own private networks, then the higher the 
number of immigrants in the community the lower the per capita expenditure of the population. 
Dealing with longitudinal data, we can take into account the unobservable heterogeneity that 
determines different attitudes towards culture, widely defined, by apparently similar municipalities. As 
already mentioned, Italian municipalities differ from each other for unobservable (as well as observable) 
components; these include features such as cultural heritage, which are not easily measurable. In this 
respect, a major complication arises here because when dealing with censored observations the estimation 
techniques relating to these unobservable components are non trivial. We shall use a Tobit model to 
consistently estimate coefficients in presence of censoring. The longitudinal dimension allows us to 
consider the unobservable heterogeneity with the approach introduced by Mundlak (1978), which makes 
it possible to distinguish between the effects due, respectively, to temporary or permanent changes in the 
covariates. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we consider some stylized facts showing the 
peculiar aspects of local public spending for culture; in section 3 we specify the model; section 4 reviews 
the econometric techniques with which we approach the issue; section 5 reports the empirical results. 
Conclusions follow in section 6. 
 
2. Some stylized facts 
In this section we offer an overview of some relevant factors affecting the cultural supply of Italian 
municipalities. The main interest is the per capita public expenditure for cultural services (monetary 
amount deflated by the CPI (2000) as released by ISTAT).4 
As mentioned above, Italy is a heterogeneous country of about 8,100 municipalities, over a total 
of 106 provinces. The vast majority of these are quite small in terms of population: about 71% of 
municipalities have less than 5,000 inhabitants and are also characterized by a different local electoral 
system. About 15% have a population between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, and 12% have between 
10,000 and 50,000, whereas the remaining 2% is over 50,000. Among the latter, those municipalities 
                                                
4 In Italy, the cultural supply provided by the public sector is largely documented, whereas the amount of available information 
regarding private supply is rather limited. The official statistics on private supply released by ISTAT (available at 
http://www.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20081013_01/) are not very helpful for this study, because details are not available for each 
single municipality. For this reason, we do not refer to them here. Moreover, we discard municipal provision of services for 
tourism from the analysis, given that, although often related to cultural supply, this is mainly devoted to the financing of 
touristic attractions targeting temporary visitors and is also widely diversified in each local area. This makes the unitary 
consideration of cultural supply and services for tourism, for the universe of the Italian municipalities, almost impossible. 
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which are also provincial administrative capitals shall be considered separately, since they are 
characterized by different financial features and by higher mediatic exposure.  
Figure 3 shows the average per capita public expenditure for cultural services by municipalities of 
different dimensions. A number of important characteristics emerge from the data. First, per capita 
cultural expenditure increases with the number of inhabitants. Over the period 1998-2006, the average per 
capita expenditure for culture is about 108 euros for the smallest municipalities, 135 euros for 
municipalities between 5,000 and 10,000, 170-180 euros for municipalities between 10,000 and 50,000 or 
more, and about 340 euros for municipalities which are administrative provincial capitals. This last group 
therefore shows a per capita cultural expenditure which is about twice that of the others. However, the 
variance is about 100-140 euros for all municipalities, but it is 220 euros for the provincial administrative 
capitals and 240 euros for the smallest municipalities. This means that heterogeneity is important, 
irrespectively of population size, and that for smaller municipalities it is even more important than for the 
others. Moreover, cultural supply differs among municipalities not only in relation to their size, but also 
to their location. As far as geographical heterogeneity is concerned, in Northern Italy (Liguria, Lombardy, 
Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto) the per 
capita expenditure for cultural services is slightly higher than in Central regions (Latium, the Marche, 
Tuscany and Umbria), with a difference of about 30-50 euros, and average expenditure of 200 and 170 
euros, respectively, in the two areas, whereas in Southern Italy (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Puglia) per capita cultural expenditure is always smaller than 100 euros. In Sardinia and Sicily 
the per capita expenditure for culture is similar to Northern regions.  
 
Figure 3: Per capita public expenditure for cultural services 
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As for types of cultural outputs, we can control for those traditionally supplied by almost all the 
municipalities, which are libraries, theaters, museums, various types of performances (broadly defined – 
including summer cultural events, vernissages, exhibitions, film/theater shows, film seasons, “white-
nights”, and the like….). Their sample average over time, distinguishing by population size and by year, 
is reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Local provision of cultural goods and services. Averages by population size. 
Theaters’ seats 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thousand  |                                  Year                                  
of inh.   |   1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006 
----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       <5 |  387.0   414.6   350.9   276.2   289.0   310.6   196.0   199.3   192.5 
     5-10 |  586.7   427.5   289.0   328.9   265.5   327.5   246.2   238.9   236.6 
    10-50 |  853.7  1146.7  1562.8  2138.1  2300.2   593.1   322.6   327.0   327.4 
      >50 | 9136.8  7371.1  3401.6  3949.9  6260.5   563.9   434.0   374.5   332.7 
  Capital | 8806.6  5153.2  3904.0  6214.0  6810.6   986.9   424.8   456.3   446.2 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of museums open to public 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thousand  |                         Year                         
of inh.   | 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
----------+----------------------------------------------------- 
       <5 | 15.2  13.2  18.9  28.4   6.8   1.5   1.3   1.2   1.3 
     5-10 |  4.5   4.5   4.8   6.3   5.4   2.0   1.4   1.3   1.4 
    10-50 |  9.2   4.6   3.9   5.5   5.8   2.1   1.6   1.6   1.8 
      >50 |  7.4  26.8  31.0  39.9   7.6   2.2   1.9   1.9   2.0 
  Capital | 15.6   9.0  11.6  12.3   6.5   3.6   1.9   2.1   2.2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of performances of various types 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thousand  |                             Year                              
of inh.   |  1998   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006 
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
       <5 |  50.7   17.1   10.7    9.3    8.6    9.4    5.2    6.4    7.9 
     5-10 |  50.5   13.1   17.6   22.8   21.1   19.5    7.1    5.1    8.0 
    10-50 |  38.1   42.2   41.6   41.3   40.6   32.5    9.3    7.5   10.5 
      >50 |  57.5   56.5   67.6  113.0   85.4   44.5    1.0    6.5   10.5 
  Capital | 254.1   56.8  214.8   88.9  110.1   55.6   23.7   17.0    7.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Two aspects of the previous table should be emphasized: first, at the beginning of the period there 
is a much higher level of heterogeneity across municipalities of different population size than in the 
following years, while over time there is a convergence, for all population sizes, towards closer levels of 
provision both by number of performances (about 10 performances per municipality in year 2006, as 
opposed to 38 performances in medium size municipalities or 250 in administrative capitals in 1998) and 
number of civic museums (2 museums per municipality in year 2006); or at least towards a smaller 
dispersion as far as the number of theater seats is concerned (depending on the specific size of the 
municipalities, from 400-9000 seats per municipality at the beginning of the period to about 200-400 
seats per municipality in 2006). This “convergence” is caused both by the electoral cycle (see below) and 
by a remarkable reduction of the central grants started in 2003, due to a tougher application of the 
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“Internal Stability Pact”, together with the imposition of limits on local public expenditures.5 For 
example, the average number of seats in theaters for cities with more than 10,000 inh. is above 5,000 until 
2002; this number was much reduced in 2003, and has stabilized, since 2004, much below 500 seats per 
municipality. These findings would be coherent with the hypothesis that cultural activities are the firsts to 
be cut in periods of difficulties for public finances.  
Second, apart from convergence, and independently of the specific service under study, per capita 
provision is larger in bigger municipalities than in smaller municipalities. However, the higher average 
level is paired to a higher variance. In particular, in provincial administrative capitals, where the average 
cultural expenditure is the highest, the variance is also the highest. On the contrary, the smallest 
municipalities, with the lowest expenditure, show quite low variance. 
As already mentioned, the final outcome of cultural expenditure is the result of, among other 
things, decisions influenced by political bargaining at the level of local government. Therefore, it is 
interesting to look at the composition of councils. We begin with an analysis of the gender, age and 
education of mayors. Only a small fraction of municipalities are led by women (less than 10%, see Table 
2, col. 1), with some differences across geographical areas: for example, 10% municipalities in Northern 
Italy (both West and East) are led by women, 5% in Islands, and 4.2% in Southern Italy. The average age 
of a mayor is about 50, with virtually no differences due to geographical area, population size or gender. 
Finally, the level of education of the mayor is, on average, quite high: in more than 80% of municipalities 
the mayor is a graduate, with no relevant differences depending on geographical area. As for the 
composition of the local government, the figures are less dramatic, as can be noted from Table 2 
(columns 2 and 3): women are more numerous in councils (14% of total number of councilors are 
women), and even more so when we consider municipal elected representatives (15 to 20% are women). 
In Southern Italy, however, coherently with a lower share of female mayors, we also find a smaller share 
of women in the council and in the assembly.  
Finally, the electoral cycle might be relevant to local cultural expenditure. Two aspects are worth 
noting: length in power and electoral years. In this respect, notice that the legal length of time for a 
municipal government  in Italy is five years, with only one possible immediate re-election of the mayor 
(art. 51, Decreto legislativo 18/8/2000, n. 267). The distribution of local administrative elections varies 
remarkably by year and by population size (Table 3). The frequency of administrative elections in small 
to medium size municipalities (up to 50,000 inh.) has two distinct peaks in years 1999 and 2004 (when 
                                                
5 The Internal Stability Pact came into force in 1999 and was intended to allow monitoring of local accounts by central 
government. After a few years, in 2002 the public finance crisis imposed a more rigid application of it, including penalties for 
those municipalities which incurred a budget deficit. 
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about 60% of municipalities were holding administrative elections), whilst in other years only 10% of 
municipalities underwent elections. In the biggest municipalities and in provincial capitals there is no 
distinct peak in the share of elections, because these are related to both local elections and to national 
political elections (over the period considered, political elections for the Italian parliament took place in 
2001 and 2006); thus we observe a slightly higher percentage of municipalities under elections in the 
years 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006. 
 
Table 2: Share of women in local political institutions (average values 1998—2006). 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Thousand  |                          
of inh.   |          Mayor          Cabinet          Council 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
       <5 |          0.077           0.141           0.230 
     5-10 |          0.092           0.139           0.201 
    10-50 |          0.072           0.133           0.168 
      >50 |          0.071           0.115           0.115 
  Capital |          0.070           0.143           0.149 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3: Percentage of municipalities holding local-administrative elections (distribution by years 
and population size) 
------------------------------------------------------- 
          |              Thousand of inh.               
     Year |      <5     5-10    10-50      >50  Capital 
----------+-------------------------------------------- 
     1998 |     7.7     14.7     22.1     29.1     31.7 
     1999 |    65.2     53.4     44.2     29.1     34.0 
     2000 |    12.4     10.7     15.0     22.8     14.7 
     2001 |    16.2     19.4     26.6     27.7     23.8 
     2002 |     9.8     19.3     25.4     41.8     26.7 
     2003 |     6.1     10.4     14.9     14.8     12.0 
     2004 |    61.5     52.6     43.3     31.6     29.4 
     2005 |    13.7     10.1     14.1     31.5     17.5 
     2006 |    16.0     17.8     24.6     26.3     25.3 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Which characteristics of the population affect the demand for cultural services? Different 
preferences can clearly be associated to differences in gender, age or nationality. Unfortunately, detailed 
data on the age of the population are not available for each single municipality. Thus, only two aspects 
shall be considered here: the share of men over total population and the share of immigrants. The former 
is almost constant, at slightly less than 50%, no matter the migration status of individuals. As for the 
share of immigrants, this is about 3.5-5% in 2006, with an increasing pattern beginning at 1.7-2.9% in 
2002, the first year for which there is available data (Table 4); this pattern is common to all 
municipalities, irrespectively of their size. In general, the figures are quite similar across municipalities of 
different population sizes, except possibly for 2006. Although the figures are quite close across 
municipalities of different population sizes, the lowest value is observed in those among the biggest 
municipalities which are not administrative provincial capitals, followed by the smallest municipalities. 
The similarity of the figures across municipalities of different population size is particularly relevant to 
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test whether immigrants increase the per capita cultural expenditure because the assimilation process 
might be “non-continuous”, i.e., there might exist some threshold below which immigrants are welcome 
and above which they are not. If such a threshold exists, the figures for all the municipalities are close 
enough to assure us both that, on average, the municipalities are at the same point with respect to the 
threshold, and that the results of our empirical application are not driven by the relative position of the 
municipalities with respect to the threshold. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of immigrants over total population in Italian municipalities (2002-2006) 
------------------------------------------------------- 
          |              Thousand of inh.               
     Year |      <5     5-10    10-50      >50  Capital 
----------+-------------------------------------------- 
     2002 |    2.35     2.61     2.35     1.73     2.93 
     2003 |    3.00     3.38     3.08     2.27     3.78 
     2004 |    3.43     3.99     3.72     2.90     4.49 
     2005 |    3.71     4.43     4.13     3.14     5.03 
     2006 |    4.00     4.91     4.58     3.52     5.55 
-------------------------------------------------------  
 
3. The model 
We follow the approach used in other areas of economics (for example Jacobs et al (2006) for health care 
expenditures), which requires the definition of the appropriate unit of analysis to study the output of 
interest. We focus on Italian municipalities as unit of analysis, distinguishing them by different 
population sizes in order to gain flexibility, as describe above. Our focus is on per capita cultural current 
expenditures, conditional on characteristics which relate to:  
1. Environmental constraints faced in the decision, , like budget constraints, population’s 
preferences, political bargaining, but also business cycle. In particular, the economic course of the 
municipality shall be considered through a polynomial of second degree in GDP. Political bargaining 
inside the council shall be considered through a set of characteristics of the council itself and of its 
components: the features of the council are related to the period in power, the electoral year, and whether 
the council is in its first or second mandate; the features of the components of the council are referred to 
individual socio-demographic characteristics of the mayor and of each councilor. We shall also control 
for the demographic structure of the population, in particular for population size and for its distribution by 
gender (share of men in the municipality). Moreover, for a shorter period (2002-2006), we shall 
distinguish immigrants from non-immigrants, to test whether immigrants increase the cost sustained by 
the entire society (for culture, in this case).  
2. Information about different cultural outputs, . The set of covariates which provide 
information about different cultural outputs included as explanatory variables are the following: number 
of theater seats, number of open museums, number of performances of various type (broadly defined – 
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including summer cultural events, “white nights”, etc.), per capita cost of libraries (purged from possible 
endogeneity, see below).  
3. Other likely adjustment covariates not classified above, . In particular, we always control for 
a set of regional dummies and year dummies. 
These characteristics leads us to the following model specification: 
         (1). 
For later purposes, we denote X the matrix containing E, W and Z, i.e. X=[E,W,Z], and with β the vector 
of coefficients, i.e. β=[β1, β2, β3]. 
Each regression shall be estimated for municipalities belonging to different bands of population 
size; these bands are the same ones already used for sample statistics in section 2. This distinction 
provides interesting information, because municipalities with different population size are likely to 
behave differently, due to different agglomeration opportunities (spill-over), congestion problems, 
economies of scale and so on. The summary statistics of the variables considered here is reported in table 
5 below. 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Cultural exp. 70193 1068.11 1244.95 0.00 31373.38 
Libraries 70193 500.86 805.55 0.00 31373.31 
Theaters 70193 9.04 2392.63 0.00 633902.30 
Museums 70193 0.00 0.03 0.00 5.89 
Shows 70193 2417.83 368466.90 0.00 56800000.00 
Female Mayors 70437 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Age 70347 84.81 258.38 21.00 2006.00 
Basic Edu. 70437 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Interm. Edu. 70437 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor degree 
or other Higher 
Edu. 70437 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Women Cabinet 70437 0.69 0.80 0.00 7.00 
Age Cabinet 69306 66.85 163.77 25.33 2006.00 
Lenght term 70437 1.76 1.34 0.00 5.00 
Term 70437 1.33 0.47 1.00 2.00 
Beginning term 61508 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Population 62615 7189.17 40204.16 31.00 2705603.00 
Share of men 
(over total 
population) 70193 49.18 1.55 31.25 66.25 
Share of imm. 39236 3.42 2.97 0.00 25.88 
Share of imm. – 
men 39236 1.77 1.70 0.00 14.77 
GDP 68680 16224.43 21848.22 1267.10 132149.00 
 13 
 
4. Econometric issues 
In this section we deal with some econometric issues that are important for our analysis. The figures 
reported above highlight great variance and heterogeneity in the data, not only due to the different size of 
the municipalities, but also to their geographic, demographic and economic characteristics. Therefore, it 
is important to preserve all features of the data, including, in particular, the fact that, first, some 
municipalities have zero expenditure and, second, all the municipalities are observed every year; this 
longitudinal dimension is crucial to study the unobserved heterogeneity.  
The main difficulty with the data at hand is related to the values of per capita expenditures, which 
are left censored at zero, since by definition they can only be non negative. If untreated, the information 
contained in the zeros is a potential source of inconsistency: on the one hand, they might not be a 
realization of the true underlying relationship, on the other hand, they cannot be simply thrown away. In 
order to cure for possible sources of inconsistencies we use a Tobit model, whereas to take care of 
unobservable heterogeneity we exploit the panel dimensionality. In what follows, we briefly discuss the 
features of the Tobit model and then address some issues related to the use of this model with panel data. 
The theory that will be outlined in this section is valid only for exogenous covariates. In the case 
of civic libraries, the municipal balance sheet does not provide information that can be thought of as 
exogenous to cultural expenditures. Indeed, we only have the cost of libraries, which is determined 
simultaneously with cultural expenses. This is a possible source of inconsistency, known as simultaneity 
bias, which must be purged through Instrumental Variable (IV) for the theory below to be valid. In a non-
linear framework, like in the Tobit model, the problem is solved following the classical IV approach, 
which will not be illustrated here (Amemya, 1974 and Foster, 1997). 
 
4.1. Pooled Tobit estimation 
We formalize the above model, equation (1), as follows. We are interested in the relationship between per 
capita cultural expenditures, y, and a set of covariates, x (recall that in our formulation, X=[E,W,Z]) As 
usual the vector of disturbances is denoted by, ε: 
              (2)  
This representation formalizes that y can take only non negative values. In these cases OLS estimates 
present some potential problems. In general the conditional mean function from an OLS regression will 
be biased, with the bias depending on the share of censored observations with respect to the total sample. 
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In the case of censoring at zero and under the assumption of normally distributed errors, the conditional 
expectation of y is  
, 
where  is the cumulative distribution function from a normal density, while , and is 
clearly different from the conditional expectation from an OLS, E(y|x)=x’β.6  
To correct the potential bias, the likelihood function should be augmented to encompass the 
information that the underlying distribution of disturbances is censored at some threshold. The complete 
likelihood is composed of censored and uncensored observations. We observe censored observations with 
probability Pr(y=0|x)=1-Φ(z), whereas the likelihood for the uncensored observations is, as usual, 
. The complete likelihood is then 
             (3) 
where the first term on the right hand side of (3) is for non-censored observations, whereas the second 
part is for censored observations.7 Overall when censored observations are a high share of the total 
sample or when we are interested in elasticity, the information contained in the zero expenditure case is 
important. For these reasons, in order to avoid possible sources of inconsistency in the estimates of the 
coefficients of interest, in the empirical analysis we will prefer a Tobit model. A drawback with the 
standard Tobit is that if the underlying disturbances are not normally distributed, the estimator, which 
strongly relies on distributional assumption, is itself inconsistent. The cure would then be either to change 
the underlying distributional assumption, which is not always a sensible procedure to follow, since once 
again it relies on other distributional assumptions; or to use a non-parametric estimator, which has heavy 
complications related to the implementation of the estimator itself. One approach that avoids any 
distributional assumption is the quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) which we will use as 
robustness check. 
                                                
6 Moreover, the marginal effects are: , which intuitively clarifies that in the OLS the bias of the coefficient β 
depends on the share of censored observations with respect to the total sample, while, at the same time, it suggests that the 
Tobit model is similar to the Maximum Likelihood times the proportion of non censored observations in the sample, which is 
an empirical regularity found in application.  
 
7 The OLS is routinely employed in these applications: an empirical regularity is that the OLS point estimates are smaller in 
absolute values than those from the Tobit method; nevertheless, consistent ML estimates are usually closely approximated by 
dividing the OLS estimates by the proportion of non censored observations in the sample (Greene, 2003). This is reassuring in 
cases where we neglect the censoring.  
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4.2. The panel dimensionality  
The above discussion supports the use of a Tobit model to consider the zero expenditure truncation. The 
other feature of interest is unobserved heterogeneity. In order to explore this feature, we exploit the panel 
dimensionality. The reference model is similar to equation (2). 
           (3) 
where the new component i is the individual effect, or heterogeneity. The estimation of the model is 
standard, but not straightforward. The first problem is whether we should consider the fixed effect or the 
random effect approach. The problem is important because the random effect estimate is consistent only 
under stronger assumptions than the fixed effect estimate, namely, that the individual effects are mean 
independent of observed covariates x; however, if these conditions are met, the random effect model is 
also more efficient than the fixed effect model. This is crucial for testing the appropriateness of the 
former model with respect to the latter and shall be analysed  through the Hausman (1978) test.  
 
4.3 The Mundlak correction 
Because the source of inconsistency of the random effect is due to a non-zero relation between x and α, 
an approach that explicitly considers the relation between them would purge the source of inconsistency; 
such a relation can be expressed as 
α = xπ+w 
where π is the coefficient for the relationship between the x and the αs, and would be zero if their relation 
is zero. Accordingly, the model specification becomes , with K(.) being the 
projection matrix of the individual effects. A simple correction amounts to the inclusion of those variables 
which are likely to be correlated with individual random effects (Mundlak, 1978), with the exclusion of 
those variables that are fixed over time (for obvious multi collinearity problems). An aspect that we 
consider particularly important is the interpretation of coefficients attached to each z. They “can be 
thought of as representing the permanent change in the relevant variable, i.e. the level effect while the 
time varying variable captures a transient change or shock effect” (Datta Gupta and Kristensen, 2008). 
Thus, thanks to this correction, we can distinguish between temporary/contingent and permanent effects, 
where the correction terms are referred to the permanent ones. 
In the next section we will use these results to study the per capita cultural expenditures of Italian 
municipalities. In particular we present all the results only in terms of a Tobit model approach in order to 
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consider the censoring at zero. As a robustness check we also estimate an OLS and a median regression 
on the same model specification. We first estimate a pooled regression, and take care of the time 
dimensionality through a set of time dummies. Given that more robust techniques are available to control 
for the time dimensionality, we introduce panel dimensionality, while preserving the information from the 
censoring at zero (the Tobit). Exploiting the panel dimensionality to estimate a Tobit model requires 
particular attention to the model specification, because we do not have sufficient statistic to allow the 
fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood; hence the Tobit model with panel data is a random 
effect model, and as such it is itself inconsistent if individual effects are not mean independent of 
observed covariates x. To solve the issue we introduce the Mundlak correction. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
On the basis of the previous discussion, we study the per capita cultural current expenditures of Italian 
municipalities modeled in section 3, equation (1), as a function of observable characteristics and 
unobservable heterogeneity. We do this in several steps. (i) On the basis of a pooled regression, we focus 
on the characteristics of the local government and of the population. (ii) Focusing on a shorter length of 
time, we study the impact of immigrants on per capita cultural expenditure. (iii) We exploit the panel 
dimension in order to explore the issue of unobservable heterogeneity. With this approach we distinguish 
the effects due to transient and permanent changes in the covariates. 
 
5.1 Pooled regression, controlling only for observable characteristics 
In Table 6 we estimate per capita current expenditure for culture, in real terms, as a function of various 
sets of covariates described in sections 2 and 3. As mentioned in the specification of the model, we follow 
the approach used in other areas of economics (see for example Jacobs et al (2006)), but we also exploit 
more refined econometrics techniques, as illustrated in the previous section – equation (2) and equation 
(4) –, in order to be able to distinguish between a short term and a long term perspective. The 
specification of covariates can give rise to practical difficulties. We try to control for as many relevant 
characteristics as possible. As shall be clear, some of the characteristics that we use can be thought of as 
providing an idea of the short-term perspectives of cultural expenditure, and are beyond the control of the 
cabinet (Datta Gupta and Kristensen, 2008).  
As already mentioned, each regression is estimated for different bands of population size relating 
to the municipalities; these bands are the same as those already used for sample statistics: the first class is 
up to 5,000 inh., the second includes 5,000-10,000 inh., the third 10,000-50,000 inh., the fourth is over 
50,000 inh. and the last is for those municipalities which are also administrative capitals of provinces.  
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In Section 3 we noticed that a possible simultaneity bias might arise between unit cost of libraries 
and cultural expenses, which we solved instrumenting the current cost of libraries with its past values. 
This is a good instrument because expenses for libraries tend to be stable over time, while not affecting 
the current total per capita expenditure for culture in the construction of the balance sheet; moreover the 
F-statistics from first stage regressions are particularly high (Bound, Jaeger, Baker, 1995).8  
Before commenting on our results, we need to point out that the share of censored observations is 
remarkably high in the smallest municipalities (about 15%) and very low in other population size 
municipalities (below 2%). However, municipalities with less than 5,000 inh. are about 72% of the total 
sample, thus the correction is in fact substantial. Our results are in Table 6, where significance levels are 
based on estimated asymptotic standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and to clustering 
arising from the panel structure of the data. 
 
Table 6: Estimated coefficients for per capita cultural expenditures by population size. IV-Tobit 
model (1998-2006). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|     Inhabitants 
                Variable |   <5,000        5-10,0000       10-50,000      >50,000      Ad.Capital 
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Libraries exp. |     1.127***       1.061***       1.075***       0.944***       0.802***   
                Theaters |    -0.000       2503.849***     440.928***      22.298        314.021***   
                 Museums |   357.017***     -88.920       -418.683       1.64e+05***    1.83e+05*     
                   Shows |    -0.000       3584.090*        -0.342      -1.28e+05***   24830.413      
              Population |     0.075***       0.018***       0.009***       0.001          0.000      
               Share Men |   -22.137***     -81.279***     -96.818***    -273.144***    -629.880***   
                     GDP |     0.003***      -0.001         -0.003***      -0.009***      -0.001      
                 GDP sq. |    -0.000          0.000          0.000***       0.000**       -0.000      
            Women Mayors |   -21.796         31.592        -20.373       -106.794       -410.208***   
                 Age sq. |     0.001***       0.001***       0.001***       0.003*         0.001      
                     Age |    -2.208***      -2.207***      -2.276***      -5.108*        -1.327      
              Basic Edu. |   -29.366         75.008**       62.256*        28.811       -240.728*     
          Secondary Edu. |  -102.835***     -14.889        -25.409        410.799***    -300.843      
             Higher Edu. |   130.045***      49.648       -175.636***                    163.485      
           Women Cabinet |    29.225***      -2.276         10.949         36.862         54.567*     
         Age Cabinet sq. |    -0.000         -0.000**       -0.000          0.000          0.000      
             Age Cabinet |     0.251*         0.357*         0.010         -0.440          0.049      
        Length Power sq. |   -17.232***      -6.647         -4.323        -19.698          4.278      
            Length power |    15.524***      20.298***      19.233***      40.576**       51.301**    
          Second mandate |    57.962***      27.219*        38.740**       51.886         25.365      
         Before Election |    31.719**       -0.087         -2.020         -7.245         69.755      
                  Region |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                    Year |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                Constant |  1073.746***    4252.808***    5194.243***   14128.743***   31566.673***   
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Statistics               |                                                                            
                    Obs. |     43410           8837           7016            387            774      
               Log.Like. |  -6.3e+05       -1.3e+05       -1.0e+05          -5326         -11718      
Number of Left Censored  |      7139             93             49              1             11      
   Number of Uncensored  |     36271           8744           6967            386            763      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                  legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01  
 
 
                                                
8 We prefer an instrumental variable (IV) approach because the formal statistical test sometimes rejects, sometimes does not 
reject the null hypothesis that both standard and IV Tobit estimates are consistent (Hausman, 1978). However, while IV 
estimates are consistent under the null and the alternative hypotheses, the OLS estimates are inconsistent under the alternative 
one, which is the decisive argument in favor of the IV approach. The F-statistic test is always above 100, irrespectively of the 
population band, the model specification or the estimation strategy. 
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As mentioned above, for larger municipalities, ceteris paribus, the per capita cultural expenditure 
is higher. Because each additional service provided to residents is costly, the estimated coefficients for 
these services are positive (negative ones are not significant at 10% confidence interval). The impact of 
libraries on per capita cultural expenditures is rather limited, although the coefficient is decreasing with 
the population size of the municipalities, with the greatest impact in the smallest municipalities and the 
smallest impact in the administrative capitals of provinces.  
As for all the other services, theaters, museums and performances of various types are the most 
important. Their impact varies depending on the size of the population, which empirically motivates our 
choice of distinguishing municipalities by population size. As for theaters, with the exception of the 
smallest municipalities, the larger the population size, the smaller the cultural expenditures destined to 
them. This is not surprising because theaters are characterized by remarkably high fixed costs.  
The coefficients attached to museums are significant and high for big population size 
municipalities because of the higher number of museums than in smaller municipalities. For the smallest 
municipalities, the impact is significant but smaller than for the largest. One likely reason for this is that 
in small municipalities museums might be open only a few days a year, thus the costs associated to 
museums are small. In medium size municipalities, the coefficient is non significant. 
The population structure has an impressive impact on cultural spending. Whatever the population 
size and geographical location, women increase the cultural expenditures more than men do. This effect 
becomes remarkable in the largest municipalities, as shown by the coefficients attached to the share of 
men, which get larger, in absolute values, as we move from the smallest to the largest bands of population 
size. There are two possible explanations for this. One is that women pay more attention to future 
generations. The other is that in Italy the share of university-educated women is higher than that of men,9 
therefore their demand for cultural services is higher, with a likely increasing effect in those places where 
per capita cultural spending is higher (this effect might be due to the fact that culture is a superior good 
and therefore a kind of attractor for its own demand).  
The GDP profile is important for medium (10,000-50,000 inh.) and big municipalities which are 
not administrative capitals of provinces. The estimated coefficients suggest that here the higher the GDP 
per capita the lower is the per capita cultural expenditure. For the smallest municipalities, on the other 
hand, the leading term is the linear term of the second degree polynomial, which is positive, thus in 
smallest municipalities the higher the GDP the higher is the per capita cultural expenditure. In 
administrative capitals of provinces, the GDP course is not very significant for per capita cultural 
                                                
9 According to latest data released by ISTAT (2007), among about 15,000 students graduating in humanities subjects in 2001, 
more than 75% were women. 
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expenditure (it is worth noting, however, that our sample period does not cover the financial crisis of 
years 2008 and 2009). 
We argued above that the political bargaining for budget allocation is crucial for the final 
outcome. We have detailed information from the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs regarding each 
individual municipal government. This information concerns age, gender and level of education of the 
mayor, as well as of each component of the council. For the council we can also consider length in power, 
whether this is the first or second mandate, and electoral year, whereas information about political 
formations, even though it is provided, cannot be employed since, as already mentioned, many of the 
parties are local/civic aggregations and we know nothing about their true political orientation.  
Among personal characteristics, age and education of the mayor play some role, with different 
impact across municipalities of different population size. In general, the impact of age is a reversed U-
shape, whereas in the case of education we do not observe a clear cut pattern. Apart from these 
differences, the relevant result is that in the administrative capitals of provinces, the personal details of 
the mayor are not very significant, whereas the characteristics of the council, in particular its length in 
power (see below), are the most explicative factor. This result is clearly important because it suggests that 
in larger municipalities the public provision of cultural goods results from political bargaining rather than 
from personal features of the local administrators, whose individual coefficients are in fact irrelevant; on 
the contrary, in smaller municipalities the personal characteristics of the mayor (with an abuse of 
terminology, the personality of the mayor) affect the public provision of cultural goods. 
As for the councilors, a higher number of women increases the total expenditures for cultural 
services, but only in the smallest municipalities and in administrative capitals. The cultural expenditure in 
smaller and medium size municipalities increases with the average age of councillors, but the profile is 
steeper in medium size municipalities, where there is no gender effect.  
The main message from this set of covariates is that as far as per capita cultural expenditure is 
concerned, in smaller communities, personal characteristics (especially those of the mayor) are more 
important than political bargaining, whereas for the provincial capitals the opposite occurs (as also shown 
in Delle Nogare and Galizi, 2009). 
With respect to the length in power of the local administration and the electoral year, we can 
notice that the former is relevant in all municipalities – but especially so in the administrative capitals, 
where the estimated magnitude of the effect on cultural spending is larger. The evidence showing that 
cultural spending increases with length in power is coherent with two different, not necessarily exclusive, 
hypotheses: on the one side, cultural spending gives visibility and therefore it might be of help for re-
election; on the other, cultural spending might not be considered a priority with respect to other duties of 
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the municipal council. In order to investigate which of these is the prevailing effect, we control for the 
second mandate of the council (low priority of cultural spending) and for the year before election (re-
election motivation). The former indicator is significant in the smallest municipalities and in medium size 
ones (up to 50,000 inh.). In these cases, the result seems to be in favour of the hypothesis that cultural 
expenditures constitute a low priority for the local government and are perceived as less important than 
other municipal duties. Additionally, we tested whether councils attract the electorate by means of 
cultural expenditure: the year before election is significant to determine the final per capita cultural 
expenditure only in the smallest municipalities. Thus, apart from this specific case, we reject the 
hypothesis of cultural expenditure as an attractor of votes. 
The result is strong enough, because the sample covers at least two electoral mandates, in all the 
Italian municipalities. The significant coefficient for the smallest municipalities on this parameter signals 
that for smallest municipalities there is a strategy of re-election through cultural activities.  
Focusing on a shorter length of time, we can test the role of immigrants in relation to cultural 
expenditure (Table 7). Detailed data on immigration started to be released by the ISTAT only in 2002. 
 
Table 7: Estimated coefficients for per capita cultural expenditures by population size. IV-Tobit 
model controlling for immigrants (2002-2006). 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|     Inhabitants 
                Variable |   <5,000        5-10,0000       10-50,000      >50,000      Ad.Capital 
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Libraries exp. |     1.095***       1.005***       1.038***       0.992***       0.735***   
                Theaters |    -0.000***    2691.990*       313.435***      36.521        234.884***   
                 Museums |   -40.709       2805.721***    -438.849       1.66e+05***    2.83e+05***   
                   Shows |    -0.000       2388.745*         5.158      -2.11e+05***    2630.665      
            Women Mayors |   -34.406          9.722        -27.948       -184.979       -487.224***   
                 Age sq. |     0.001***       0.002***       0.002***       0.006**        0.002      
                     Age |    -2.713***      -3.259***      -3.325***     -10.701**       -4.473      
              Basic Edu. |   -22.250         58.495         38.571        260.830*       -34.691      
          Secondary Edu. |  -121.989***       7.487        -51.220        453.905***    -313.646      
            Higher Edu.  |   111.726**      126.617**     -198.849***                                 
           Women Cabinet |    39.794***       7.524         17.068         77.759**       79.232***   
         Age Cabinet sq. |    -0.000         -0.000**        0.000          0.000**       -0.000      
             Age Cabinet |     0.362*         0.551**       -0.063         -0.820**        0.596      
        Length Power sq. |    -6.800         -0.974         -2.765         -5.060          1.347      
            Length power |    19.638***      18.640***      17.877**       36.320*        52.189**    
           Second mandate|    38.877***      30.045         70.847***      92.814        -17.287      
         Before Election |     6.787        -25.576         -0.600         43.131         26.788      
              Population |     0.070***       0.013*         0.008***       0.003          0.000      
               Share Men |   -18.937***     -98.342***    -128.772***    -341.343***    -642.272***   
              Share Imm. |    67.725***      32.117         -3.055       -591.829***     183.104      
          Share Imm. Men |  -108.320***     -14.998         56.067       1054.750***    -332.260      
                     GDP |     0.003***      -0.002**       -0.003***      -0.011***       0.001      
                 GDP sq. |    -0.000*         0.000*         0.000***       0.000***      -0.000      
                  Region |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                    Year |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                Constant |   842.147***    4986.657***    6541.716***   17139.278***   32084.955***   
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Statistics               |                                                                            
                    Obs. |     27244           5568           4441            241            477      
               Log.Like. |  -4.0e+05         -84561         -64214          -3186          -7099      
Number of Left Censored  |      4137             54             25              0              7      
   Number of Uncensored  |     23107           5514           4416            241            470       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                  legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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We estimated the previous model specification, augmented by the number and the gender composition of 
immigrants. The coefficients attached to the number of immigrants can be zero (the number of 
immigrants has no effect on the cultural per capita expenditure) or different from zero.  
The coefficient can be interpreted as the correlation (an association, not a causation) between the 
demand for public cultural goods by immigrants and the actual provision of cultural public goods. The 
correlation can be zero or different from zero: in cases where it is different from zero, if the “public” 
demand made by immigrants is low, then the per capita cultural expenditure decreases as the number of 
immigrants increases (due, for example, to private networks among immigrants, the cultural expenditure 
is the same, but the population size is higher, thus the share decreases) and thus the coefficient would be 
negative; if the demand made by immigrants is high, the per capita cultural expenditure increases to 
match the demand for these goods and services (due for example to a deep interaction between migrants 
and non-migrants) and thus the coefficient would be positive. 
Our test on the impact of immigration requires a detailed answer. In general, the view that 
immigrants increase public expenditure, at least for culture, is rejected. This is an important result, 
because it is usually thought that immigrants free ride on native as far as publicly supplied goods and 
services are concerned, which is one of the main reason against increasing inflow of immigrants. 
Nevertheless, a further important distinction occurs by geographical location (not reported). It turns out 
that for different population sizes of the municipalities, the share of immigrants is largely irrelevant in all 
the areas but in the central Italy (e.g., Abruzzi, Latium, Marche, Tuscany, Umbria), where immigrants 
lower the per capita municipal expenditures for culture; when the population size is greater than 50,000 
inh., apart from islands, the higher the share of immigrants, the lower the per capita cultural expenditure. 
Immigrants actually increase the capital expenditure in the smallest municipalities, where the per capita 
amount goes from 50 euros for Northern-West regions to 150 euros for Southern regions. In the 
municipalities that are also administrative capitals, the estimated coefficient is largely non significant. We 
find this result quite interesting because it rejects the common view of immigrants as free riders on public 
supply. An important part of the story would be related to the presence of enclaves of immigrants (Wilson 
and Porter, 1980)10 on which, however, available data do not allow us to say anything. Nonetheless their 
presence would not imply free riding on the non-immigrant part of the population. In this context, in fact, 
ethnic enclaves would be coherent with a scarce demand of publicly provided cultural services by 
immigrants.  
                                                
10 An ethnic enclave is a neighborhood, district, or suburb which retains some cultural distinction from the surrounding area. 
Typically enclaves flourish around businesses that are run by the members of the community and attract newly arrived 
immigrants. 
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5.2 Panel regression, controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics 
Thanks to the richness of the data, the explanation of per capita cultural expenditure as a function of the 
above covariates is a novelty with respect to the existing literature. Nevertheless, we do not know whether 
and how the results are driven by observable or by unobservable characteristics. Moreover, we are 
missing an important part of the story, since we are unable to distinguish the effects due to a permanent 
change of covariates from those due to a transient change (Datta Gupta and Kristensen, 2008). In this 
section we try to identify these effects. 
Using appropriate techniques, the panel nature of the data allows us to disentangle the individual 
unobservable heterogeneity from the observable effects of the covariates. Once again, we use a Tobit 
model as a cure for the zeros, which however relies on the assumption of normal distribution of residuals, 
whose non-linearity is particularly troublesome when estimating panel data fixed effect models (because 
there is no sufficient statistic capable of “eliminating” the individual fixed effects). This limits our ability 
to discern between fixed and random effects, but also, and more importantly, it might invalidate the 
consistency of our estimates. In fact, when the model is properly specified, the distinction between the 
two estimators is inessential.11 For this reason, under the (admittedly strong) assumption of a correctly 
specified model, we estimate a Tobit model, augmented for the Mundlak correction. This basically 
consists of the inclusion of the individual mean of the (time varying) regressors that might be correlated 
with the individual random effects (see Section 4). As a robustness check, to know whether the RE 
estimator in this application would be biased and how, we also estimate a linear regression model with FE 
and RE, with Mundlak correction included: in all the cases, except for municipalities with population 
between 5-10,000 inh., we do not reject the consistency of RE specification, based on the Hausman test 
(1978). This result reassures us that with this model specification, FE and RE are both consistent, so we 
are confident in our RE, corrected as suggested in Mundlak (1978). Moreover, if the RE is consistent, the 
estimate is also more efficient than the FE estimator.  
The point estimates with panel data are in Table 8. The results are reported distinguishing between 
“short term” and “long term” coefficients, which helps in distinguishing between changes in covariates 
that are temporary or permanent, respectively. It is clear that the pooled regression estimates will be valid 
in the long run, but not necessarily in the short term. 
 
                                                
11 In fact, it turns out that “without loss of generality, it can be assumed from the outset that the effects are random and view 
the FE inferences as a conditional inference, that is, conditional on the effects that are in the sample. It is up to the user of the 
statistics to decide whether he wants inference with respect to the population of all effects or only with respect to the effects 
that are in the sample” (Mundlak, 1978, pag.70). 
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Table 8: Estimated coefficients for per capita cultural expenditures by population size. IV - Tobit 
model exploiting panel nature of the data (1998-2006). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|     Inhabitants 
                Variable |   <5,000        5-10,0000       10-50,000      >50,000      Ad.Capital 
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      SHORT TERM 
          Libraries exp. |     1.240***       0.918***       1.293***       0.735***       1.619***   
                Theaters |     0.000        628.050***      50.671        -60.546         55.250      
                 Museums |   131.760        131.436         50.642       -894.855      97759.836      
                   Shows |    -0.000        504.055         -0.264      -9818.318      -2.59e+04      
              Population |    -0.114***      -0.039*        -0.025***      -0.018***       0.001      
               Share Men |   -15.867***      32.370**       18.093        -51.761       -322.078***   
                     GDP |    -0.006**       -0.002          0.004*        -0.013***       0.004*     
                 GDP sq. |    -0.000         -0.000         -0.000          0.000***      -0.000      
            Women Mayors |     5.392         -2.095         27.204       -168.606**      -89.822      
                 Age sq. |     0.001***       0.000          0.000          0.003***       0.002      
                     Age |    -1.550***      -0.578         -0.479         -6.626***      -4.091      
              Basic Edu. |   -21.129         18.748         21.977          0.232        -19.845      
          Secondary Edu. |   -66.843***     -28.748         -0.515        -61.988         17.750      
            Higher Edu. |    10.023         -7.476        -38.093                       119.846      
           Women Cabinet |     9.154          2.458          0.941         16.423         -8.487      
         Age Cabinet sq. |    -0.000         -0.000          0.000         -0.000         -0.000      
             Age Cabinet |     0.108          0.118         -0.110          0.243          0.244      
        Length Power sq. |   -12.442***      -6.517***      -4.785**      -10.425         -4.225      
            Length power |    14.217***      15.784***      18.770***       2.601         31.220*     
                  Second |    45.720***      16.337*        -7.829        -50.782         13.350      
         Before Election |    69.149***      14.254         10.450        -19.407        104.727**    
      LONG TERM 
            Libraries |     0.275***       0.481***       0.167***       0.737***      -0.445***   
                Theaters |    -0.004                       719.299***     701.576**      869.879***   
                 Museums |   471.447      -2101.679      -2187.197       3.08e+05**    63717.906      
                   Shows |     0.000          0.011*        -1.033      -2.43e+05**    -3.15e+04      
              Population |     0.183***       0.044**        0.030***       0.021***      -0.000      
               Share Men |    -2.087        -86.971***     -71.439***    -102.315        -78.972      
                     GDP |     0.008***       0.002         -0.004***       0.006*        -0.005**    
                Constant |   794.391***    2900.754***    2904.706***    7687.399**    19863.676***   
                  Region |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                    Year |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Statistics               |                                                                            
                    Obs. |     43410           8837           7016            387            774      
               Log.Like. |  -2.9e+05         -64598         -50065          -2654          -5900      
Number of Left Censored  |      7139             93             49              1             11      
   Number of Uncensored  |     36271           8744           6967            386            763      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                  legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
When considering short term changes in covariates the coefficients on libraries and theaters (but 
only for population size inh. between 5-10,000) are still significant. In contrast to the results from pooled 
regression, a short term increase in population size decreases cultural expenditure, and the impact is 
larger the larger the population size. The share of men has a controversial effect: positive in medium 
municipalities (5-10,000 inh.), negative in the smallest and in the administrative capitals, and zero 
otherwise. The polynomial on GDP is significant only in the largest municipalities. However these are 
only transitory effects which do not make a difference for the quality of life of the individual. 
When we consider the set of covariates related to the council, which are transient by definition, 
previous results from pooled regression (Table 6) are confirmed. First, only in the smallest municipalities 
the personal characteristics of the mayor are significant, which is coherent with the view that, in small 
local communities, the mandate is given to the person rather than to political groups, which are almost 
undistinguishable; the opposite occurs in the other municipalities, where neither the characteristics of the 
mayor, nor those of the components of the cabinet affect cultural expenditure.  
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Amongst the council’s features, the most important is its length in power because the longer the 
time in power the higher the per capita expenditures, in particular for the smallest municipalities and for 
the administrative capitals of provinces. Could this be interpreted as an indication that cultural 
expenditure is one way to acquire electoral consent? As in previous models, to answer the question, we 
control for the second mandate and for the electoral year: they are jointly significant only in the smallest 
municipalities. The indicator for second mandate (culture as low priority) is significant also in the 
medium size municipalities (5,000-10,000 inh. at 10% significance level), whilst the indicator for 
electoral year (culture as attractor of votes) is significant in administrative capitals of provinces.  
This result sheds light on the strategic behavior of councils: first of all, the mandate characteristics 
(whether it is the first or the second mandate) play a substantial role only for the smallest municipalities. 
Second, the practice of spending more for cultural services before the elections, as a likely strategy to 
attract votes, is followed only in smallest municipalities, where the coefficient attached to electoral year is 
slightly higher than the coefficient for the second mandate, and in administrative capitals of provinces 
where the coefficient is remarkably high. In other municipalities, neither mandate characteristics nor 
strategic behavior add information which helps to explain cultural expenditure. As for the effect of 
permanent changes of covariates, the Mundlak correction coefficients for libraries can be thought of as 
the long term impact of libraries on per capita cultural expenditures. The higher the expenditure for 
libraries in the long run, the higher is the per capita cultural expenditures (apart from the case of 
administrative capitals). Moreover, for municipalities with more than 10,000 inh., a higher number of 
theater seats increases per capita cultural expenditure, as does a higher number of museums, although 
only for biggest municipalities which are not administrative capitals of provinces. 
Most important are the socio-demographic characteristics of each municipality. From the 
correction terms, we note that the smaller the municipality, the larger is the effect of a permanent increase 
in the population: indeed, as we move from smaller to larger municipalities the correction coefficient gets 
smaller (and it is not very significant in the largest municipalities). As for the economic cycle, a 
permanent increase in the GDP increases per capita cultural expenditure in the long run, but only for the 
smallest municipalities or for those that are big, but not capitals of provinces. The estimated coefficient of 
the GDP is negative and strongly significant for administrative provincial capitals. This supports our 
choice of keeping separate the administrative provincial capitals, whose cultural activities are apparently 
maintained independently of the economic outlook, exactly because of their mediatic exposure. This 
might also imply that a permanent increase in GDP determines a lower need for public spending, which 
can be substituted by private expenditure. 
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Quite interestingly, once we make the distinction between short term and long term changes in the 
covariates, the coherence between pooled regression and panel approach is re-established. We stress this 
distinction because it is usually neglected in empirical applications; furthermore, the Mundlak correction 
supports the view that long term factors play an important role, whereas transient characteristics are 
largely irrelevant, something that cannot be said by pooling all the observations.  
To sum up the results obtained so far, we have identified different sources of heterogeneity in the 
decisional process: the services provided, political bargaining, and the composition of the population, 
possibly distinguishing short term and long term changes in the covariates. There is at least one more 
observable determinant which belongs to the population composition and certainly affects political 
bargaining; this is related to immigrants, and we shall analyze it below. 
By focusing on the restricted sample 2002-2006 (Table 9), we investigate the impact of 
immigrants taking advantage of the panel structure of the data, which allows a distinction between the 
short and the long term changes in the share of immigrants over the total population. In the following 
discussion, we devote special attention to the political characteristics and to the structure of the 
population. 
The coefficients are qualitatively similar to the coefficients used in the model which did not 
include the number of immigrants.  
As far as political characteristics are concerned, in this shorter sample, the personal characteristics 
of the mayor and/or components of the cabinet are again significant only in small municipalities, whereas 
the characteristics of the council are important in all municipalities, except for big ones which are not 
administrative provincial capitals. On the contrary, in the longer period sample, only in the smallest 
municipalities the hypotheses of low priority of cultural expenditures and of cultural expenditure used as 
a strategy to attract voters are confirmed; on the other hand, unlike previous findings (Table 8), any 
evidence of a strategic behavior linked to the second mandate and the electoral year vanishes, 
respectively, for medium municipalities and administrative capitals. On this basis, we conclude that the 
practice of spending more money for cultural services before the elections, or that of considering cultural 
expenditure as a low priority, is robust to model specifications and to different approaches only in 
smallest municipalities, whereas in all other municipalities there is no clear evidence of this. 
Unlike the pooled regression, the point estimates are different when we consider population 
characteristics: the indicator for total population and the indicator for gender composition are higher in 
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absolute values with respect to the model without controlling for immigrants, which is a symptom that 
immigrant presence plays a non trivial role in determining the final outcome.12  
 
Table 9: Estimated coefficients for per capita cultural expenditures by population size. IV - Tobit 
model controlling for immigrants (2002-2006). 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|     Inhabitants 
                Variable |   <5,000        5-10,0000       10-50,000      >50,000      Ad.Capital 
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      SHORT TERM 
          Libraries exp. |     1.131***       0.546***       1.135***       1.523***       0.592***   
                Theaters |    -0.000        648.452**      -15.105         58.229         54.784      
                 Museums |   -44.405        943.680       -251.487      30259.591      42590.871      
                   Shows |    -0.000*       281.590          3.377      -7.78e+04*     -8.00e+04*     
            Women Mayors |    16.975        -13.466         16.079       -219.854***      88.434      
                 Age sq. |     0.001***       0.001*         0.000         -0.001          0.004*     
                     Age |    -1.744***      -1.326         -0.065          1.961         -7.040*     
              Basic Edu. |   -18.768         36.473         29.427         55.258        279.281***   
          Secondary Edu. |   -74.404***      20.037         -2.739        -84.703         92.909      
             Higher Edu. |   -25.236          8.954        -82.125                                    
           Women Cabinet |    14.002*        10.062          3.973         27.863*        18.588      
         Age Cabinet sq. |    -0.000         -0.000          0.000         -0.000          0.000      
             Age Cabinet |     0.148          0.144         -0.080          0.155         -0.442      
        Length Power sq. |    -5.437**       -1.145         -2.038         -7.072         -7.401      
            Length power |    21.353***      15.815***      17.021***      12.594         52.087***   
                  Second |    25.714***      16.586        -14.617        -30.581         64.737      
         Before Election |    35.573***      10.511          9.478         -0.557         29.746      
              Population |    -0.166**       -0.109***      -0.030***      -0.002          0.001      
               Share Men |   -16.153*        37.424        -48.077         44.082       -296.145      
              Share Imm. |    -1.595          4.335        -89.326**     -120.532        -44.482      
          Share Imm. Men |    -1.196          4.732        153.240**      171.115         21.801      
                     GDP |    -0.011***      -0.002          0.003         -0.015***       0.005***   
                 GDP sq. |    -0.000         -0.000          0.000          0.000**       -0.000*     
      LONG TERM 
    Mundlak -- Libraries |     0.376***       0.840***       0.289***       0.106          0.736***   
                Theaters |    -0.002                       771.243***     693.054***     792.559***   
                 Museums |   424.059      -1661.436      -2565.951       2.64e+05**    36702.791      
                   Shows |     0.000          0.009         -1.343      -1.83e+05*     64855.986      
              Population |     0.227***       0.115***       0.035***       0.005         -0.001      
               Share Men |     5.296        -93.439***      -8.170       -258.993*        51.740      
              Share Imm. |    51.398**       33.807         85.462       -317.737*       444.525      
          Share Imm. Men |   -78.759*       -41.211       -126.426        552.789*      -756.062      
                     GDP |     0.015***       0.001         -0.004*         0.010***      -0.006***   
                  Region |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                    Year |     YES              YES           YES     YES   YES   
                Constant |   456.649       2853.761***    3063.969***   10999.216***   11728.081*     
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Statistics               |                                                                            
                    Obs. |     27244           5568           4441            241            477      
               Log.Like. |  -1.9e+05         -40516         -31738          -1585          -3487      
Number of Left Censored  |      4137             54             25              0              7      
   Number of Uncensored  |     23107           5514           4416            241            470      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In general, the coefficients attached to immigrants are irrelevant when the change of the share of 
immigrants is in the short term, but are significant when referred to permanent changes. Indeed, the 
correction coefficient is significant for the smallest municipalities as well as for the largest (but not for 
administrative capitals). However, the impact is very different in the two cases: whilst a permanent 
                                                
12 To see this more formally, consider the total population (T) as the sum of immigrants (I) and non-immigrants (N); should we 
estimate the equation of interest Y=β T=β (I+N), the β would be a (weighted) average of β1 and β2 in the regression Y=β1 I+ β2 
N, i.e. we would impose the undue restriction β1=β2, introducing a bias due to the aggregation of immigrants and non-
immigrants. The aggregation bias with this panel approach is exacerbated because of the distinction between short term and 
long term. In fact, it turns out that if we add up the coefficient for the population within all the models (coefficient for the short 
term, plus coefficient for the long term in panel regression; coefficient of population alone in pooled regression) they are 
virtually identical across model specifications and approaches, thus the apparent difference of coefficient is the effect of the 
composition of the population.  
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increase in the share of immigrants over the total population increases per-capita expenditures on cultural 
services for the smallest municipalities, for the largest municipalities the opposite occurs.  
We interpret these figures as follows: in the smallest communities the higher the number of 
immigrants, the higher the per capita cultural expenditure, possibly because in these contexts cultural 
integration is simpler than in larger communities, where indeed the estimated coefficient is negative. For 
communities of medium size, the impact is irrelevant whether we consider the short or the long term.  
 
6. Conclusions  
In recent years municipal governments in Italy have acquired a stronger role with respect to central 
government in the supply of cultural goods and services, not only in traditional fields such as those 
involving civic libraries, museums and theatres, but also in the organisation of cultural events of various 
types. Following the approach used in other areas of economics (such as those related to health care 
expenditure), we have modeled the Italian municipalities’ per capita cultural current expenditures in 
relation to characteristics that encompass the environmental constraints faced in the decision (such as 
budget constraints, the population’s preferences, political bargaining, but also business cycle); 
information about different cultural outputs (libraries, number of theater seats, number of open museums, 
number of performances of various types, broadly defined – including summer cultural events, “white 
nights”, etc. ); and other adjustment covariates, such as regional dummies and year dummies. 
On the basis of a unique dataset relating to all 8,100 Italian municipalities and including their 
balance sheets, the institutional-political features of the local governments, as well as socio-demographic 
characteristics and economic indicators, we have analyzed the determinants of local expenditures for 
cultural services by Italian municipalities in order to explain the heterogeneity in local expenditure for 
culture as a function of observable characteristics, while recognizing that unobservable heterogeneity 
might also play a role. 
Besides the traditional determinants of local public spending related to the goods and services 
supplied, the other elements considered are shown to be important for cultural spending. In particular, it 
turns out that per capita cultural expenditures increase with population size, but decrease with the share of 
men over total population. With respect to the share of immigrants, we have obtained different results, 
depending on the size of the municipalities. The economic conditions of the municipalities are relevant in 
that an increase in the local GDP increases per capita cultural expenditure. Finally, per capita cultural 
expenditures are affected by features of the local government, namely length in power, and, at least for 
smallest municipalities, electoral cycle. 
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By means of more refined econometric techniques which preserve the panel nature of the data, we 
have also shown that the above characteristics basically hold in the long run. In other words, per capita 
cultural current expenditure is not affected by transient phenomena, but only by permanent changes. 
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APPENDIX 
The data regarding the public cultural expenditure of all 8,101 Italian municipalities have been made 
available by the Italian Ministry of Interior since 1998, as a part of the municipal balance sheets. Since 
that year, municipal balance sheets have followed a uniform structure, which includes three main 
categories: demographic details, economic information and services provided. 
The first component in the balance sheet (named “Quadro 1”) is related to demographic information and 
concerns the number of inhabitants, the number of families, the number of districts, etc. Unfortunately, 
the quality of the data in this part of the document is considered scarce and the figures included are 
sometime unreliable if compared with the official statistics provided by ISTAT. For this reason, we 
decided not to use this source for demographic information, as explained later. 
The second component is the most important for the economic profile of each municipality. It is 
composed of various items related to revenues (“Quadro 2”) and current and capital expenditures 
(reported in detail, respectively, in “Quadro 4” and “Quadro 5”). Expenditures are further divided into 
twelve functional areas: general administration, justice, local police, public education, cultural services, 
sport and leisure, tourism, roads and transports, environment, social services, economic development, 
productive services.  
The third part of the data relates to services offered to inhabitants: most important for this study are 
(various indicators of) theaters, museums, performances and similar cultural services. The quality of this 
data is a critical issue, because there is no official external source for comparison at a municipal level for 
all 8,100 municipalities. ISTAT does publish some data, aggregated at provincial level, as does the Italian 
Ministry of Culture (MiBAC), but in those cases where the figures differ, one does not know which 
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municipality is responsible for the gap between the two sources, nor which of these is most reliable. We 
have approached this problem by considering these covariates as measured with errors, in which case our 
conclusions would still hold (due to the attenuation bias in estimated coefficients).  
When possible, as in the case of the data set concerning demographic information, we have compared the 
details contained in the balance sheet to external sources. In particular, we matched our dataset with that 
from ISTAT to obtain information on number of inhabitants and gender distribution, by single 
municipality. In so doing, we also recovered the distinction between immigrants and non-immigrants, at 
least starting from 2002 – a distinction not made in the balance sheet. In this respect, notice that a 
shortcoming of the data released by ISTAT regarding the immigrant distribution is that we can only 
observe the number of regular immigrants; this is an issue that must be borne in mind, although irregular 
immigrants are likely not to consume publicly provided cultural services. Details regarding age are 
missing, except for the year 2001, when there was a general census in Italy.  
As for the political characteristics of the municipalities, the information comes from the Statistical Office 
of the Italian Ministry of Interior and is released, since 1985, on a yearly basis. We refer to the period 
1998 onward. The data contain demographic characteristics of each single component of the council and 
elected representative, namely, name, gender, date and place of birth, level of education and job; the 
connection between individuals and their role can be traced through the data pertaining to the role in the 
cabinet of each member (basically whether mayor, councilor or elected representative), their date of 
election and political affiliation. Although not explicitly reported, it is easy to exploit this information in 
order to infer the length in power of the council and the electoral year of each Italian municipality. 
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